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Policy Messages 
•  Southern Africa has become an increasing focus of humanitarian concern as the 
perceived frequency and severity of food crises has intensified over the past decade. 
•  Private trade could help reduce the severity of these crises, but governments and 
traders find themselves in a vicious circle, in which lack of trust leads to behavior that 
further undermines trust, producing outcomes unattractive to both. 
•  The boom in world commodity prices has accentuated concerns about food crises, 
and has already reinforced governments’ tendencies to restrict trade during crises. 
•  Yet the price boom makes efficient regional trade especially important during food 
crises; continued ad hoc trade restrictions will constrain the development of market 
institutions that could otherwise reduce food price spikes and fill production shortfalls 
more quickly than the public sector. 
•  Empirical policy analysis is a crucial input for escaping from this trap, but to be 
effective it must be embedded in an ongoing consultative process involving 
government, traders, donors, and policy analysts; without such consultation, policy 
analysis will largely be ignored except by those that already agree with it. 
 
INTRODUCTION:  Southern Africa is 
an increasing focus of humanitarian 
concern. The rate of perceived food crises 
in the region has increased sharply during 
this decade, with identified crises in 
2001/02, 2002/03, and 2005/06. The world 
commodity price boom that started 18 
months ago has accentuated concerns 
about the potential severity of future 
crises.  This Policy Synthesis summarizes 
the findings of detailed analysis (Tschirley 
and Jayne 2007) about the current staple 
food situation in the region and about how 
governments have behaved towards 
markets and regional trade during food 
crises over the past decade. We then ask 
whether these responses show evidence of 
learning from past mistakes.  Lastly, we 
consider how the commodity price boom 
affects the role of regional trade during 
food crises and the likely stance of 
governments in the region towards trade.  
The analysis concludes that the breach 
between actual and needed government 
policy during food crises threatens to 
become wider than ever as a result of the 
price boom, and suggests ways in which 
empirical policy analysis might contribute 
to closing this gap.  
 
BACKGROUND:  Staple food sectors in 
the region show three important trends:   
(1) substantially less correlation of 
production across countries than in the  
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past; (2) surprising stability in regional 
production and prices; and (3) more 
diverse production, marketing, and 
consumption patterns.  
 
Production across countries is less 
correlated than in the past, creating more 
opportunities for trade:  Production in the 
region has become far less covariant 
during the last decade (Table 1).  From 
1990 to 1999, correlation coefficients on 
production between South Africa, 
Zimbabwe, and Zambia were large, 
positive, and highly statistically 
significant; during the second overlapping       
10-year period they were much lower and 
none were significant.  Correlations 
between those three countries and 
Mozambique and Malawi were small and 
insignificant during both periods, with one 
exception: a large, significant, and 
negative correlation between Mozambique 
and Zimbabwe during the second period.  
 
Maize production has become less 
variable over time, not more:  Maize 
production in southern Africa is 







1 Mozambique, South Africa, Malawi, Zambia, 
Zimbabwe, and Swaziland. 
increasingly variable. Yet official data 
suggest production has become more   
stable over the past decade.  From 1990 to 
1999, the median year-on-year change in 
total regional production
1 was nearly 20%, 
with changes exceeding 50% during four 
of the 10 years.  Median year-on-year 
change from 1996 to 2005 was only 10%, 
and no single change exceeded 30%.   
Coefficients of variation in production fell 
during the second overlapping ten-year 
period in all countries except Zimbabwe. 
 
Per capita maize production has not 
fallen in the region:  Per capita maize 
production in the region has shown no 
trend since 1990, despite clear declines in 
per capita area harvested. More 
surprisingly, aside from Zimbabwe, per 
capita maize production has 
unambiguously declined only in Zambia, 
and there the decline has been largely 
offset by increased cassava production 
(Chitundu, Droppelmann, and Haggblade 
2007).   Malawi’s   per capita maize 












2 Though widespread doubts about extremely high 
official production figures for 2006 and 2007 
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Data sources:  FAOSTAT  
Table 1.  Correlation Coefficients of Reported Maize Production among Selected Southern African 
Countries, 1990-2005  
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Real maize prices show no discernable 
trend since 1994:  Maize price data are 
much less affected than production data by 
concerns about data quality, and price data 
reinforce the production story: nominal 
USD prices in the region show no 
appreciable trend since 1994, with the 
statistically significant positive trend since 
2001 largely offset by a comparable 
negative trend before that time (Figure 1).  
Furthermore, emerging evidence (Jayne et 
al. forthcoming) shows that, in real local 
currency  terms,  maize  prices  have  fallen        
sharply in Zambia between 1994 and May 
2008, have shown no trend in 
Mozambique, and have risen slightly in 
Malawi. In all three cases, the large run-up 
in world prices denominated in USD is 
much less severe when food prices are 
expressed in real local currency terms. 
These price trends suggest that, if access to 
food is more difficult for more people in 
the late 2000s than it was in the early 
1990s, it must be due to declining incomes 
among sub-populations in the region; on 
an  aggregate  level, production and  prices 
both suggest steady or increasing per 
capita food supplies over the period. 
 
 
Production, marketing, and consumption 
patterns have become more diverse, 
creating greater opportunity for markets 
to stabilize consumption:  These changes 
are linked to the reduced subsidy to and 
control of maize systems that began in the 
early 1990s.  Especially in the more 
isolated and agro-ecologically less 
advantaged areas, cultivated area has 
begun to diversify away from maize, with 
cassava especially filling the gap in 
Zambia and Malawi and continuing to be 
an important staple in the most heavily 
populated rural areas of Mozambique. 
Liberalization has also encouraged the 
development of decentralized private food 
systems that redistribute maize and other 
locally produced foods between surplus 
and deficit households, regions, and 
countries. Informal trade between northern 
Mozambique and Malawi is  well known; 
less appreciated is the active trade between 
Tanzania, Malawi, Zambia, Zimbabwe, 
and Mozambique (FEWSNet 2008). 
Note:  Prices in RSA are SAFEX cash prices for white maize grain; all others are white maize grain prices at retail. Mozambique 
is a mean of Maputo, Xai-Xai, and Maxixe in the south; Zambia is a mean lf Lusaka, Choma in the south, and Chipata in the 
east; Malawi is a mean of Lilongwe, Karong, and Nkata.  The trend is from a linear regression of the pooled data. 
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Figure 1.  Maize Grain Prices in Southern Africa and Time Trends, 1990-2007  
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These informal systems, based on small-
scale trading, milling, and consumption of 
a wider range of types of maize meal, have 
contributed to the real price trends noted 
above, despite fewer subsidies to the 
systems and booming USD prices in world 
markets.  
 
Consumer expenditure patterns also appear 
to be diversifying away from maize.  In 
rural areas of southern Mozambique, rice 
and wheat have a higher combined budget 
share than maize (15% vs. 11%; Tschirley 
and Abdula 2007).  Wheat’s share in 
Lusaka and Kitwe cities of Zambia – the 
two largest in the country – exceeds that of 
maize.  Maize’s budget share is certainly 
higher in rural areas, but the trend towards 
greater diversity in consumption is likely 
to be the same.   
 
All three of these trends – more diversified 
production and consumption, and more 
decentralized food distribution systems 
(including regional trade) – should reduce 
the region’s dependence on external food 
aid during droughts by broadening the 
consumption base and making it easier to 
move local surpluses to populations in 
need.  Capitalizing on this opportunity 
requires increased productivity and a much 
more open policy regarding border trade; 
only Mozambique currently has such a 
policy.   
 
GOVERNMENT RESPONSE TO 
FOOD CRISES:  Table 2 provides 
summary information on the five major 
food crises to occur in the region since the 
early 1990s.  Tschirley and Jayne (2007) 
discuss the handling of the crises in detail, 
making four key points.  First, the crises 
show widely divergent characteristics, 
with regional supply balances ranging 
from a 10m mt deficit to a 2m mt surplus.  
For example, while the 1992/93 crisis was 
spurred by a massive, region-wide drought 
that left no prospect for meaningful 
regional trade, the 2005/06 crisis featured 
a regional surplus in South Africa able to 
cover the entire deficits of Malawi and 
Zambia.   
 
Second, during all three crises of this 
decade, regional trade could have played a 
major role in meeting national deficits and 
stabilizing prices, either because the region 
was in surplus (2005/06), or because South 
Africa and Mozambique (in 2002/03) had 
surpluses and the regional deficit was 
small (2001/02) or moderate (2002/03).   
Third, during all three crises this decade 
Malawi and Zambia repeated behaviors 
that systematically hindered the ability of 
private traders to make a positive 
contribution to more stable food prices 
during the crises.  They did this either by 
creating policy uncertainty that “froze” the 
private trading sector into inaction 
(Zambia), or by outright government 
control over all trade.
3 Finally, 
Mozambique resolutely keeps its borders 
open but fails to deal with tariffs on 
imported maize meal and VAT on 
imported maize grain that put the south of 
the country, which has the highest urban 
population, at risk during shortages 
(Tschirley and Abdula 2007); these were 
major contributors to Mozambique’s 
unusual price spike in 2005/06.  Overall, 
the review argued that governments in the 
region have shown great inertia in how 
they handle markets during food crises.   
To a large extent, Zambia and Malawi do 
now what they have done in the past, 
resorting to even greater control of   
markets during food crises than during 
normal supply years, restricting the scope 
for private trade and putting upward 
pressure on food prices. Even 
Mozambique is doing what it has done for 
nearly 20 years in allowing the private 
sector to import and export at will; and it 
has been difficult to generate any interest 
among policy makers there to examine the 
impact of the tariff and VAT policies on 
 
3  Despite these hindrances, commercial trade 
(though some as in Malawi was done by 
government) accounted for three times more of the 
et inflow to the region in 2002/03 than did food aid. 
  - 5 -
Table 2.  Summary of Production and  Stock Outcomes for Southern African Crises,  
and Scope for Trade  
 
consumers’ access to food, despite their 
dramatic effect on maize prices in 
2005/06. 
 
IMPLICATIONS OF HIGHER 
WORLD COMMODITY PRICES:  
Higher world commodity prices are likely 
to increase the importance of regional 
trade in staple foods in southern Africa.   
South Africa’s market is much more 
strongly linked to world markets than are 
the markets in Zambia, Malawi, 
Zimbabwe, and even Mozambique; the 
latter are more insulated from world 
markets by transport costs, and also are 
unable to export into international markets 
due to deficient quality and contracting 
standards.  A logical implication of this 
observation is that prices in South Africa 
should be more affected than those in other 
countries of the region by the world price 
boom. In fact, this pattern can already be 
seen.  Shortly after prices denominated in 
nominal USD boomed in South Africa, 
those in Zambia, Malawi, and 
Mozambique all dropped below import 
parity (IPP) from South Africa, and with 
one exception (Lilongwe during a single 
month), have remained well below that 
level ever since.  This is the second longest 
and by far the most pronounced gap 
between local prices and IPP since at least 
1999.  This gap between interior country 
prices and South African prices reflects the 
fact that world prices have been more fully 
passed through to South African markets, 
and that transport costs from South Africa 
to interior countries have risen 
dramatically.  Consequently, IPP is very 
much higher, implying more room for 
these countries to meet their own food 
needs and mitigate the upward pressure on 
food prices if they can increase farm 
productivity and improve trade among 
themselves. 
 
Instead of this increased trade among 
neighbors, however, these countries show 
signs of moving in the opposite direction.  
Zambia, Malawi, and Tanzania have all 
imposed export bans or trade restrictions 
in maize over the past 24 months to protect 
domestic supplies.  Ironically in the case 
of southern Africa, these policies will 
likely lead to more unstable supplies and 
more unstable and higher prices for all 




year  Production 
Outcome  Beginning Stocks  Overall Supply 
Scope for Regional Trade 
  Outcome 
1992/93  -65%  Very low  Massive deficit, > 10 mmt  Very little.  Need for massive 
international imports  ------ 
1995/96  -37%  Very high, > 4mmt  Deficit 2 mmt   
More than 1992, but modest  ------ 
2001/02  -9%  About average, > 2mmt  Small deficit, ~ 1mmt 
 
Great scope; high stocks meant 
supplies in RSA and N. Moz 
sufficient to cover regional needs 
Malawi: Huge price spike above 
IPP;  Zambia: lesser but also large 
spike above IPP;  Moz: Prices 
well below IPP 
2002/03  -1%  Historically low, <500,00 mt  Deficit up to 3mmt 
Great scope, due especially to 
surplus in RSA.  Exports from 
RSA, N. Moz, and Tanzania 
 
Malawi: Very large imports, 
depressed prices throughout 
2003/04;  Zambia: similar to 
previous year, spike above IPP; 
Moz: Prices well below IPP 
2005/06 +15%  Above average, 
~ 3 mmt  Surplus up to 2 mmt  Great scope due to large surplus in 
RSA> 
 
Large price spikes in each 
country, but went above IPP only 
in Mozambique. 
Note: Production outcomes are relative to the 1990-2005 mean.  Source:  FAOSTAT for production data; FEWSNET for stocks; INTERFAIS for 
food aid.  
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ESCAPING THE TRAP: THE 
POTENTIAL AND LIMITS OF 
EMPIRICAL POLICY ANALYSIS:  It 
is not difficult to generate a list of actions 
that governments should take to improve 
market performance during food crises – 
and thus reduce the magnitude of the crisis 
and the cost of responding to it.  The most 
basic is to focus their own actions on being 
transparent, detailed, and timely in sharing 
information about emergency response 
plans with private traders as well as millers 
and other processors, and giving them full 
latitude to decide, in light of this 
information, what volume of commercial 
imports to procure.   
 
It is important that policy analysts 
continue to make the case, in as many 
ways as possible, for this type of behavior 
on the part of governments.  Learning does 
have a role to play in policy change.  Yet 
policy surrounding emergency response in 
Zambia and Malawi reflects a deep 
mistrust between government and the 
trading sector.  The situation in both 
countries shows characteristics of a 
“wicked problem”, in which beliefs are 
grounded in competing cultural norms and 
resolution resists factual analysis (McBeth 
et al. 2007).  The turn towards political 
democracy may make the problem more 
intractable, since governments need to be 
seen to be “doing something” about the 
fundamental conditions of their populace’s 
lives, and emergency response provides a 
compelling stage on which to do so.  There 
is no simple solution to this problem. One 
certainty is that for empirical policy 
analysis to have an effect on policy, it 
must be embedded in an ongoing 
consultative process involving 
government, traders, donors, NGOs, and 
policy analysts. Within such a process, 
good policy analysis can slowly make the 
case for more effective approaches to these 
problems; outside of such a process, even 
the best analysis will largely be ignored 
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